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Abstract
The sense-making work carried out by anyone in interaction can be described as based
on different aspects of meaning, basically the propositional meaning of talk and the
interactional or situated meaning of words spoken. Moreover, in a conversation
involving three or more persons, sense is arguably made also on the basis of the
participation framework (Goffman, 1981), continuously negotiated in and by talk. This
composes a theoretical platform for the analysis of the distribution of responsibility in
an interpreter-mediated encounter; responsibility for the substance and for the
progression of talk. The paper suggests an interactionistic, non-normative, dialogical
approach to studies of interpreter-mediated talk for a deepened, developed under-
standing of the interpreter’s role in face-to-face interaction. 
0. Introduction
This paper will discuss the distribution of responsibility in face-to-face
interpreting. It is not an effort to normatively define the responsibility
of the interpreter in general, or in interpreting of a particular kind. We
will look at existing norms, but leave aside for the moment the
discussion about which norms could or should be valid for performers
of face-to-face interpreting. Instead, this paper aims at exploring the
responsibility of an interpreter as implicated in actual interaction. The
interesting thing about resposibility then is how it is distributed in and
through talk. And in order to be able to study this phenomenon, it is
necessary to set focus on the interpreter-mediated encounter as a whole.
This situation can be seen as a special case of three-party talk or of
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multi-party interaction (cf. Keith, 1984, Knapp-Potthoff & Knapp,
1987). Let us look at interpreting as interaction.2
1. Aim
My aim here is two-fold. On the one hand I want to shed light on how,
in a two-language encounter, responsibility for the progression and the
substance of interaction is distributed in and through talk. On the other
hand, in doing this, I want to point at some theoretical implications of
applying a interactionistic, non-normative, dialogical approach to
studies of interpreter-mediated interaction. Since this is not a main-
stream theoretical stance within interpretation studies, I will devote
some space to make a few important distinctions.
2. Theoretical preliminaries - interpreting as inter-activity
It is a trend in translation studies to focus not only on the results of
translators’ activity, but on the activity as such. Nevertheless, most
studies are concerned with how the individual translator performs the
translation activity (for instance, more or less adequately). The same
thing could be argued for many studies of interpreters and interpreting.
The interpreting individual and her interpreting activity is being
explored as such. The focus can be set on interpreting as the individual
interpreter’s cognitive ability and skill. An alternative approach is to
focus more on interpreting as a linguistic and social competence, as
suggested by for instance Anderson (1976), Harris (1981), and Berk-
Seligson (1990). Depending on the questions we wish to raise we will
see interpreting as social action or as social inter-action. Potentially, the
scope of the theoretical frame will provide different analytical impli-
cations. 
Seen from an interactionistic perspective, the interpreter takes part in
a social situation, where she potentially has a unique possibility to
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2 This paper condenses some central ideas presented in my Ph.D. dissertation
(Wadensjö, 1992), Interpreting as Interaction. Earlier versions were presented at the
DAAD symposium “Dolmetschen als interculturelles Mitteln”, Bayreuth, July 1993, at
the research colloquium ”Information und Repräsentation”, Hildesheim, November,
1993, and at a TÖI seminar (Institute for Interpretation and Translation Studies),
Stockholm University, December, 1993. My journey to Bayreuth was supported by a
travel grant from the Swedish Institute. 
understand everything said and therefore a unique possibility to over-
view and coordinate interaction. Given that we choose this perspective,
and take into consideration not only the interpreter, but the interpreter-
mediated encounter as a whole, we have to consider (at least) two
important aspects of the interpreter’s activity. The interpreter’s dis-
course has to be analysed both as relaying or translating and as
coordinating or mediating. These aspects are simultaneously present,
and one aspect does not exclude the other. As a matter of fact, these
aspects condition each other. Thus, to make this clear: On a certain level
it is not an empirical question if the interpreter is a translator or a
mediator, or a relayer or a coordinator; she is both. Given that inter-
preting is regarded as interaction, the empirical issue concerns how the
interpreter’s relaying and coordinating take shape in practice, under
different situational conditions.
Research on interpreting concentrating on the interpreter’s activity
of translating is often normative due to the simple fact that when some-
thing is identified as non-translating, it is by definition against the norm
stating that interpreters should just translate. Combine this with a mon-
ological view on language and language use, and their non-translating
will be described as individual deficiencies or failures. 
2.1. Monologism and dialogism
Traditionally linguistics and the language sciences work with the
theoretical model of language as an abstract, normative system of
linguistic items.  According to such a model, words and expressions own
a certain meaning. It is as if they have in and by themselves a certain
meaning glued on to them, just by having a given place in a particular
language system. What has developed for instance as applied linguistics,
cognitive science and communication studies work with alternative
models of language. The object in focus is language use, which is seen
as processes or practices, inter-individual or intra-individual. And the
different perspectives imply different views on the question of how or
where meaning is created, for instance, within the individual mind or in
the situation between people.
In preparing for a communicative study of dialogue interpreting it is
important to distinguish between two major alternative models of
communication, namely the transfer model and the interactionistic
model. The transfer model, also labelled the conduit model (Reddy,
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1979) has a strong impact on the everyday life understanding of
interpretation, including sign language interpretation (cf. Roy, 1989). It
implies conceptualizing interpreting as a unidirectional process of
transfer, from one language to another, or one text to another. The
conduit model is monological. Language use is regarded from the
perspective of the speaker. The meaning of specific words and
utterances are seen as resulting from the speakers intentions or
strategies, while co-present people are seen as recipients of the units of
information prepared by the speaker. It is as if while creating meaning,
the individual speaker is thought away from her interactional context
and thought into a social vacuum. 
An interactionistic approach implies that language is viewed and
explored as a historical and social phenomenon, continuously repro-
duced and recreated by being used (Bakhtin, 1986a, b). The use of lan-
guage is regarded as social activities, connected to different genres and
layers of contexts. In contrast to the transfer model, the social
interactionistic model is dialogical. According to this model, meaning
is conceptualized as co-constructed between speaker and hearer(s) in
interaction. Meanings can thus not be described entirely in terms of
individuals’ intentions. On the contrary, the sense each individual
makes of specific words and expressions, of what is heard and said, is
understood to be drawn partly from the already known use of these
words, partly from the interlocutor’s knowledge about the ongoing
practice where a particular utterance is voiced and partly from the
interlocutors’ actions in interaction. The potential meaning we adhere
to words and phrases is matched against time, place, social situations
and thereby associated communicative genres. Talk provides in itself a
social context to ongoing talk. The different epistemologies, mono-
logism and dialogism, imply different units of analysis: “Whilst mono-
logism assumes individuals and societies (cultures) to be analytical
primes, dialogism takes actions and interactions, e.g. the discursive
practices, in their contexts as basic units” (Linell, 1994:11) (cf. also
Holquist, 1990, Marková & Foppa, 1990). 
3. Practice and norms
Being myself a state-authorized Swedish interpreter (between Russian
and Swedish) I know the general norms of interpreting. We may note
114
that these normative expectations concerns me both as a translator (just
translate, translate everything, translate adequately) and as a person with
a position in between two parties, i.e. as a mediator (be neutral). And, as
most interpreters, I also know that practice may confront me with
dilemmas and give me reason to ask the question: How do I actually go
about translating everything, just translating, translating adequately and
being neutral? In practice?
The practice I have in mind is work within social welfare, court-
rooms, the police and in hospitals. The Swedish community interpreter,
what we have called “Dialogue Interpreter” (Sw: dialogtolk) (Linell et
al, 1992), enjoys a professional status comparable to community
interpreters in countries like Australia, and comparable to professional
sign language interpreters in a growing number of countries. There are
professional organizations and state certification for those who qualify
(which has to be renewed every fifth year). There are also other
institutionalized quality tests, and the interpreter’s job is regulated by
an official code of conduct. This does not mean to say that everyone
working as an interpreter in the public sphere in Sweden does this for a
living, or are state certified. Nevertheless, those who do work with
social service as interpreters are in principle expected to subscribe to
the official ethical code. The interpreter is hired not by one person or a
company, but by the society, and is paid by the state or the municipality,
just like other representatives of public organisations. (Still it remains
to be explored, though, where, when and how individual interpreters’
loyalties are formed, in the professional organization of interpreters, at
the places of work, in groups of immigrants and refugees etc.). 
As Goffman (1961) suggests, exploring a social role, you naturally
look at the normative role expectations associated with this particular
role. However, this will give you information only on one aspect. Ideas
about normativity towards which an interpreter orients herself when
working is one thing. How her social role is actually lived, i.e. carried
out in practice, is another thing. Moreover, we have to consider not just
one person’s normative expectations. When studying a social role, the
constellation of people is the basic analytical unit, not the individual. In
exploring the role of dialogue interpreter one has to see her in relation
to those others confirming or rejecting her in this role. You will also
have to consider that individuals are multiple-role performers (Goff-
man, 1961:142). The interpreter can be confirmed or not in her role as
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interpreter as well as in possible other social roles (such as woman,
compatriot, foreigner, well-educated, etc.). 
It appears that an interpreter’s typical self-image is deeply influ-
enced by the partly codified normative role, to use a concept from
Goffman (1961), that is, what a performer of the role normally thinks
she ought to do when she does a good job. One frequently used meta-
phor for the interpreter’s job is the copying-machine. Another is the
‘telephone’: the interpreter is thought of, and thinks of herself as a
channel, an instrument conveying information, someone who affects
the words, messages, and utterances of the monolingual parties in a
merely technical sense (cf. the conduit model discussed above).
Judging from interviews and informal talks, active interpreters together
with their instructors are not the only ones to express their under-
standing of an interpreter’s work by these metaphors. So are many
employers. This does not exclude that interpreters constantly and
knowingly break the rules, and constantly experience a need to
legitimate their rule-violating behaviour.
The following would be a normative account of a conversation in
which an interpreter (I) and two monolingual parties talk, i.e. a profes-
sional (P) speaking the majority language, and a lay person (L)
speaking a minority language: 
P: Utterance 1 (in the majority (P’s) language)
I: Utterance 1’ (= rendition of U1 in the minority language)
L: Utterance 2 (in the minority (L’s) language)
I: Utterance 2’ (= rendition of U2 in P’s language)
P: Utterance 3 (in P’s language)
I: Utterance 3’ (=rendition of U3 in L’s language)
etc.
We have already mentioned that, from a normative point of view, the
interpreter is expected to just translate, translate everything and
translate adequately what the primary parties say. This norm concerns
the dialogue interpreter as a translator. Still the official norm concerns
the interpreter also as a person with a position in between. As such she
is supposed to be neutral. In the above schema this is visible in the fact
that the interpreter is expected to take every second turn at talk.  
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4. At the policestation
Let us keep this schematical model in mind and look at a piece of
authentic discourse. Our question about the distribution of responsi-
bility will be considered in relation to a short extract of interpreted talk,
drawn from an encounter at a Swedish policestation. A Russian-
speaking woman, Alisa, has been called to the immigration department
at a Swedish policestation. She is interviewed about an application for
residence permit in Sweden. She meets Peter, a policeofficer. His job is
to write a report, on the basis of which her case will be decided. He is
typing this report while interviewing her. The interlocutors are assisted
by an interpreter - Ilona. We come in when the officer asks questions
about Alisa’s future plans.
We will start by looking at what the interpreter says. In principle she
says what the others say, hence this should be a way for us of getting the
content of the encounter. In the real communication situation the
interpreter spoke Russian and Swedish. Here all utterances are roughly
translated into English (below each utterance).3
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3 Transcription conventions:
Underlinings in the extracts indicate simultaneous talk. 
, = “continuing intonation” (a prosody-shift after a unit of talk indicating that it is not
completed and/or that the speaker does not want to drop the turn).
. = “terminating intonation” (indicating that the speaker is prepared to relinquish the
turn, or, at least, that an informationally completed unit of talk has been issued)
? = “questioning intonation”
- = sudden cut-off of the current sound.
... = “open-ended intonation” (utterance fading out with an ambiguous intonation
terminal)
: = the sound just before has been noticeably lengthened.
(.) = a short silence (micro-pause).
boldface = emphasis, which may be signaled by increases in pitch and/or amplitude.
° ° (framing part of an utterance) = pronounced in sotto voce
(Extract from G 22:4)
Peter = policeofficer, Alisa = applicant, Ilona = interpreter
Peter: 1. (types for 15 s.) mm. jag vill att du... eem...
spekulerar litegrann. om... hur (.) hur du kan
använda din utbildning- ditt yrke i Sverige. vet du
nå’t sånt? o- om du får tillstånd i Sverige. (starts
typing)
(types for 15 s.) mm. I want you to... erm... speculate
a little. if... how (.) how you can use your education-
your profession in Sweden. do you know anything
about that? i- if you get a permit in Sweden. (starts
typing)
Ilona: 2. z [jxe xnj,s ds::: gjlevfkb d cke[ j njv7 rfr ds
cvj;tnt bcgjkmpjdfnm cdj. ghj- ghjatccb. d
Odtwbq pltcm7 tckb ds gjkexbnt
hfphtitybt yf gjcnjzyyjt ;bntkmcndj7
I want you to::: think aloud about. how you can use
your pro- profession in Sweden here. if you get a
permanent residence permit. 
Alisa: 3. ye777 z levf. xnj777 vyt yflj gthtexbnmcz7
well... I think that... I have to retrain myself
Ilona: 4. jag tror att jag måste skola om mig.
I think that I have to retrain myself.
Alisa: 5. ye d cvsckt njuj xnj z dj gthds[ yt pyf.
idtlcrjuj zpsrf6
well in the sense that I for one thing don’t know the
Swedish language,
Ilona: 6. med tanke på att jag inte kan svenska.
bearing in mind that I don’t know Swedish.
Alisa: 7. ye b yfdthyj pltcm vtlbwbyf dc/-nfrb yt nfr
hfpdbnf rfr e yfc d Cjdtncrjv Cj.pt7
gj=njve777
well and probably here Medicine after all is not so
developed as ours, in the Soviet Union. that’s why...
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Ilona: 8. å... med tanke på att... e::: medicinsk utveckling är
inte på samma nivå som i Sovjet.
and... bearing in mind that... e::: medical
development is not at the same level as in the USSR.
Alisa: 9. ytn7 ye d cvsckt- gj=njve- f gj
cgtwnfkmyjcnb freithrj-ubytrjkju6 z levf. xnj
b pltcm jyb nht,e.ncz7 dhfxb7
no. well in the sense- that’s why- and my specialty is
obstretics4, I think that here these are also needed.
doctors.
Ilona: 10. och e::: mitt yrke är... barnmorska gynekolog och det
tror jag nog man behöver såna här med.
and er::: my profession is... midwife gynaecologist
and these I would think are also needed here.
Peter: 11. jaha. skola om sig. ja ja. okej. du- du menar att skaffa
dig kunskaper i svenska eller... komplettera? eller...
e::: jag hänger upp mig på uttrycket skola om sig. då
tänker jag på nåt helt annat yrke. °kan vi utreda det.
(.) bara lite.°
aha. retrain oneself. yes yes. okay. you- you mean to
get some knowledge in Swedish or... do a refresher
course? or... er::: I have problems with the expression
retrain oneself. then I think about an entirely different
profession. °can we clear this up. (.) just a little.°
Ilona: 12. a näe det- det var... mitt fel.
a no it- it was... my fault.
Peter: 13. mm,
mm,
Ilona: 14. de- det var just det hon tänkte på.
thi- this was just what she had in mind.
From Ilona we learn that the officer says: “I want you to::: think aloud
about. how you can use your pro- profession in Sweden here. if you get
a permanent residence permit” (2). The woman responds: “I think that
I have to retrain myself” (4). She fills in: “bearing in mind that I don’t
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4 lit:=midwife gynaecologist.
know Swedish” (6). And she continues: “And... bearing in mind that...
er::: medical development is not at the same level as in the USSR” (8).
She goes on: “And er::: my profession is... midwife gynaecologist and
these I would think are also needed here” (10). And then comes: “Oh no
it- it was... my fault”, “thi- this was just what she had in mind” (12) and
(14). 
It seems here as if Ilona takes on responsibility for some kind of
interactional problem. Comparing (12) and (14) with (11) and (13) we
see that they are not renditions of the preceding utterances. You could
argue that this interpreter simply made a mistake. If you relate her talk
with the norm stating that interpreters should just translate, this would
perhaps be what you would conclude. You might also claim that she
was breaking the norm of neutrality, protecting or preventing Alisa
from speaking for herself and the officer from addressing Alisa. But if
we want to understand what the interpreter did, and the interactional
mechanisms behind this, we have to apply another approach. 
5. Participation framework and responsibility
We have pointed at one interesting duality in an interpreter’s job. She
has the mandate to relay and to coordinate the others’ talk. Another
duality lies in the fact that it is her job to both speak for others and listen
on others’ behalf. Although it is often overlooked in scholarly
discussions, listening is obviously an important constituent of
conversation. If interpreting a speech of an orator at a rostrum implies
little or no doubt from the point of view of the interpreter that the
original(s) indeed is (are) intended to have the status of original(s), the
dialogue interpreter, the interpreter on duty in conversation, is
constantly confronted with assessing how, and by whom, interlocutors
intend their utterances to be understood. In the course of interaction, the
dialogue interpreter at work, more or less consciously, evaluates
interlocutors’ speakership and listenership; how the parties relate to the
conversation. In Goffmanian terminology she monitors and contributes
to the participation framework (Goffman, 1981:226, cf. also Wadensjö,
1992). 
The organization of talk accomplished in interaction could be
described in terms of interlocutors’ distribution of speaker-hearer
roles, or altering between different footings. The distribution of
speaker-hearer roles may actually determine whether the monolingual
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parties’ contributions end up as off-the-record, or as on-the-record talk.
We need to expand briefly on Erving Goffman’s analytical model.
Goffman states:
When a word is spoken, all those who happen to be in the perceptual
range of the event will have some sort of participation status relative
to it (Goffman, 1981:3).
To have some sort of participation status is thus the same as possibly
being ascribed and/or taking on some sort of hearer’s role. If you are the
one who speaks the word, you will simultaneously take on and be
ascribed also a speaker’s role. The idea is that listening and speaking
are activities that condition each other. They do not exclude each other.
As a speaker, says Goffman, you have different modes of relating to
what you say, different production formats (animator, author and
principal). This means that by talking you can display different aspects
of self and thereby take and/or are given more or less responsibility for
the substance and the progression of interaction. 
1) You can be seen and/or regard yourself as an animator of other’s
words. The authority and the responsibility behind what you say is
given to someone else/taken to be someone else’s. You are just ”the
sounding box”.
2) You can be seen and/or regard yourself as an author, i.e. you might
ascribe the ultimate responsibility and authority behind your utterance
to someone else, but you take on and/or are ascribed responsibility for
composing the utterance.
3) You can be taken as and/or take yourself as a principal of an
utterance, i.e. be the animator and the author of it without ascribing to
someone else the ultimate responsibility for what you say, and/or you
would be understood as carrying the responsibility and authority for
what you say.
In the same way as we can distinguish between different ways of
relating as a speaker to a word spoken, we could distinguish between
different ways of relating as listeners to what is said in encounters to
which we are present, between different reception formats (for a
detailed discussion, see Wadensjö, 1992:117-125). The idea is that you
can determine from the way a person is listening that she takes more or
less responsibility for the progression and the substance of common
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interaction. Thus, a simple parallel to Goffman’s suggested production
format would include the following three concepts: reporter,
recapitulator and responder
1) You can listen in order to be able to repeat exactly, word by word; I
have called this to listen as a reporter. 
2) You can listen in order to be able to summarize; listen as a
recapitulator.
3) You can listen in order to be able to contribute an adequate
continuation; listen as a responder.
Note that one way of listening does not exclude the other, but the way
in which a person responds to an utterance in interaction indicates what
kind of listening is predominant, or what kind of listening the person in
question focuses on. 
5.1. The encounter in retrospect
My interest for the piece of discourse presented in the extract above was
originally raised by the interpreter. On that day at the policestation,
when the interview had ended, and she and the researcher, i.e. myself,
were waiting for the next person to be interviewed she said to me: Äsch,
gthtexbnmcz - det är väl omskola, skola om sig? (“Damn,
gthtexbnmcz  (“to retrain (oneself)”) - it is retrain, to retrain oneself,
isn’t it?”) “Yes, but you can take it differently” I suggested. “Yes, but
you see how fast I am backing out” Ilona says, quoting herself, “’yes,
yes, it’s my fault’ - it wasn’t my fault! It’s so typical you know. I get so
irritated.” (G22:18).
These comments raise a number of interesting questions. Ilona, in
retrospect, saw it as a mistake to admit guilt when she actually had
translated correctly the word “retrain oneself”. Who was to blame then?
What for? We have a general tendency in interaction to attribute guilt to
someone in particular when misunderstandings are discovered or
feared. This is due to the limited perspective of individual actors in the
here-and-now situation. In a detailed analysis of discourse however, it
is possible to discover the complexities of connections between
interlocutors’ contributions (cf. Linell, 1992).
Let us think about the situation quoted in another way; the
interlocutors did neither the right nor the wrong thing, but something,
122
which at a particular point in time gained a certain communicative
sense. Alisa expressed herself in a rather unclear way. She used a word
gthtexbncz (“to retrain (oneself)”), and at first you could think she
displayed an interest in, or openness to the idea of trying a new
profession, and after a few turns at talk it seems clear that what she
meant to say was that she wanted to learn Swedish, but that she
assumed her present professional competence to be quite valuable in
the new Swedish context. At least that is how the officer understood
her. We can see from the dialogue, in (11), that he took notice of a
possible idea of changing profession, but this idea leaves no sign in his
written report. We also know that this understanding was made explicit
only when the officer’s report was read aloud at the end of the
encounter for the applicant to approve of or correct. Here, when Ilona
says: “that’s what she meant” (14), there is no more discussion on this
issue. 
Meanwhile, Ilona’s post-interview comment suggests that at first she
had believed her choice of terms in Swedish, skola om mig (“retrain
myself”) (4) was faulty; that it does not correspond to the Russian
expression Alisa had used. However, she begins to doubt that she was
wrong, and she is confirmed in her belief that she had indeed made a
correct interpretation of gthtexbncz (“to retrain (oneself)”). The two
expressions, in Swedish and Russian respectively, could be said to be
equivalent. They have overlapping, even if not identical, meaning
potentials in the different languages and cultures. Realizing this, Ilona’s
grounds for self-blame, as it were, disappear. Still, she is angry with
herself. My point is that the reason for this could be described in terms
of her being tempted or forced into alternating between different
footings, different speaker-hearer roles. 
What we see is an example of one of these typical dilemmas of the
dialogue interpreter’s practice. The discrepancy between the concepts
for “retrain (onself)” in standard Russian and Swedish respectively
function both as a resource and as a trouble source in two-language
interaction. The interpreter is expected/takes it upon herself to provide
a translation to vyt yflj gthtexbncz (“I have to retrain (myself)”)
at a point in time when Alisa is in the process of formulating an answer.
Later, when Alisa specifies the Russian expression in a somewhat non-
standard way, the particular expression Ilona has provided as a
translation, skola om sig,  turns out to be a bit out of place. 
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As a general point we may note that the interpreter, to a considerable
extent, must treat fragments of interaction as decontextualized wholes.
In terms of participation framework, when assuming the recipient role
of reporter, her understanding has a local, single-original-to-single-
rendition (turn-to-turn) basis.   
In the literature on social interaction, partial repetition of prior talk is
assumed to occur in particular sequence-types. Among these are “other-
initiated repair” (Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks, 1977), speaker’s
disagreement with prior speaker’s self-deprecations (Pomerantz,
1984:83-84), and with the activity of arguing (Goodwin & Goodwin,
1987). All these findings might add to the explanation of why Ilona in
this particular situation takes on a personal responsibility; that she
aligns as a responder to what the officer says, in (11), providing a direct
response and thus relating as an author to her own utterance without
ascribing to Alisa the principalship (12). 
5.2. The encounter revisited
Let us look again at Peter’s utterance in (11) above. He starts “aha.
retrain oneself. yes yes. okay.”, which sounds like a confirmation,
indicating that the prior utterance(-s) are understood. Then he draws
attention back to what is actually meant by what is said: “you- you
mean to get some knowledge of Swedish or... do a refresher course?
or... er::: I have problems with the expression retrain oneself”. He
seems to react to what to him might appear as inconsistency in terms
and calls attention to what has actually been said. In other words, Peter
initiates a negotiation of the meaning of skola om sig (“retrain
(oneself)”), re-using the formulation given by Ilona (naturally enough,
as he does not speak or understand Russian). 
In utterance (14) Ilona relates as an author to another’s words. She
gives voice to the applicant, providing a summarizing (even if quite
vague) rendition of Alisa’s utterance(-s): de- det var just det hon tänkte
på. (“thi- this was just what she had in mind.”).  Simultaneously, the
interpreter covers up for the expression skola om sig (“retrain oneself”),
relating to it as something she was herself responsible for, rather than
ascribing responsibility for it to Alisa. Interestingly enough, her alter-
nating between footings corresponds to the officer’s alternating
between footings. Peter finally adds “can we clear this up ”, in (11). A
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certain change in how he relates to his interlocutors is displayed here,
first and foremost by a change of tone in his voice. If the first part of his
utterance could well be understood as relating to Ilona as recipient-
reporter (i.e. Alisa is referred to in his “you mean” etc.), the end of it,
in a lower voice, sounds rather as if relating to the interpreter as a
responder or recapitulator, i.e. as someone included in his pronoun of
address (“can we clear this up”). A change of footing is cued by voice
characteristics (cf. Gumperz’ (1982) notion of contextualization cues).
Understood like this, the officer projects to Ilona a responder’s
listenership in relation to what she hears, and therefore also an author’s
speakership in relation to what she is to say in her subsequent utterance.
Ilona, in turn, aligns to such a footing, addressing not the applicant but
the officer. Peter’s contribution opened up first for one, later for another
possibility. This change in Ilona’s footing is furthermore supported by
what Peter implicitly draws attention to, finally adding in an even lower
voice, “just a little.”, in (11). The interpreter is hereby reminded of the
time limits to the encounter in question, typically set by an institution of
this kind. 
What is clear from the excerpt above is that Alisa has difficulty in
expressing herself on a particular issue initiated by the officer; that she
wants to provide an answer, but starts to do this without being sure what
she actually wants to say. This is a dilemma she has to face as an
applicant of residence permit. She is anxious to make a good
impression, which includes, if possible, avoiding saying anything that
could put her in a bad position. In this particular case, the applicant
seems to start out by displaying a wish, a preparedness or a willingness
to change professions. On second thoughts, she tries instead to remedy
the impression the first utterance may have brought about. It may have
come to Alisa’s mind that presenting herself as a person having this
attitude to her professional qualifications would perhaps harm her
chances as applicant for a residence permit in Sweden. It could be
added here that according to traditional Soviet law, a person’s right to
settle in a particular place is/was closely related to her enrolment at a
workplace. 
We may further note that Alisa’s statements concerning the
advancement of medicine in the USSR compared to the Swedish
standards (“well and probably here medicine after all is not so
developed as ours, in the Soviet Union. that’s why...”) (7) is relayed
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somewhat more vaguely by Ilona (“and... bearing in mind that... er:::
medical development is not at the same level as in the USSR.”) (8).
Moderating Alisa’s statement Ilona potentially acts to save the
interlocutors’ faces. Simultaneously she sees to it that communication
continues smoothly on a focused issue (i.e. the applicant’s view on her
Soviet education in a Swedish context). At this point she is teaming up
with Alisa (which does not exclude an alliance with Peter). Intuitively
or not, Ilona in this way protects also her own working conditions, in
between the other two, keeping alive the primary interactants’ mutual
interest in sustaining a common activity, namely talking.
The situation analysed seems to touch the heart of the dialogue
interpreter’s dilemma, inherent in her normative role as faithful
translator and neutral coordinator. It is possible that Alisa is aware of
the fact that it has a root in her saying vyt yflj gthtexbnmcz (“I have
to retrain myself”), or in her feeling of insecurity. Perhaps this is
completely obscure to her. Be that as it may, but a feeling of akwardness
definitely comes over Ilona and her use of the expression
gthtexbnmcz/skola om sig (“retrain (onself)”). One should note
however, that this becomes manifest only when Peter brings up the
meaning of the expression as the focused object of conversation. 
The fact that Peter ascribes to Ilona a responder’s role, and that she
aligns to such a position in relation to his utterance, means that she
changes her relationship to the expression discussed. Where Ilona had
once related to skola om sig (“retrain (onself)”) as an animator of
another’s words, she is later ascribed and/or takes on the role of
someone more responsible for the words used, due to fluctuations of
participation framework. It could be noted that, throughout the
encounter, Peter largely asked questions by consistently addressing the
applicant directly, and not by addressing the interpreter. As he
explained it in a post-interview, he consciously followed the
recommended way of talking through an interpreter. Nevertheless,
there were moments like the one illustrated above, where a momentary
alternating of footings was displayed, sometimes, as in (11), within one
and the same utterance. 
As is shown, these alterings of speaker-hearer roles are the result of
participants’ joint activity. In a normative sense the interpreter is a non-
participant in interaction, but in practice her involvement may be
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continuosly fluctuating. A dialogue interpreter’s ability to keep in mind
different production formats and reception formats simultaneously, and
still be able to keep them apart, is probably one of her most essential
skills.
6. Final remarks
The interpreter is supposed to make sense of, and make more or less
explicit for the primary parties, what is said and what is heard. Given
that we regard the translating task and the coordination task as
constitutive for the interpreter’s job, it is possible to distinguish
between at least three different aspects of sense-making involved in her
work. Firstly, we make sense of words and utterances on the basis of
what we know about the propositional meaning of talk. Secondly, sense
is made on the basis of the interactional meaning of talk. The
interactional meaning created may be influenced on a local level, e.g.
by the use of words in a particular part of an utterance, in a particular
speed and intonation, accompanied by particular gestures, and other
actions etc., and on what is present on a more global level, e.g. by a
particular constellation of people, in combination with a particular time,
place and social activities other than talk. Thirdly, sense is made on the
basis of what is cued by the participation framework negotiated in and
by talk. (Who is addressing whom, and who is supposed by whom to
react how? In who’s name and on who’s account do people interact?).
Given an interactionistic perspective, the same aspects of sense-
making is of course present in any conversation involving three or more
persons. To engage in spoken interaction means to coordinate one’s
listening and speaking with others’ listening and speaking. In a two-
language talk, the interpreter’s task is to translate for others and to do a
certain part of others’ coordinative work. Different aspects of sense-
making are arguably involved in the distribution of responsibility in
interpreter-mediated interaction.
The interpreter has a position in between the layperson and the
officer. In a certain sense, she is in control of the encounter. Without her
presence there would be no interaction at all. The monolingual persons
cannot or do not wish to speak in a common language. This does not
necessarily mean that she is in charge of the situation or that she
conducts it. Anyhow, to explore the distribution of responsibility in a
particular interpreter-mediated interaction will have to involve
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exploring what is done to establish and sustain the interpreter’s middle
position; what is done by the interpreter as well as by the primary
parties.
What from a normative, individualistic and a monological point of
view looks like contrary positions, translating on the one extreme and
mediating on the other, can be conceptualized as two mutually
compatible dynamic aspects of the interpreter’s inter-activity, given a
non-normative, interactionistic, dialogical theoretical frame. 
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